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1. SUMMARY: Whether the "derivative works exception" to 
the termination of transfers provision of the Copyright Act of 
- n ,~ 
1976, 17 U.S.C. §304(c)(6)"(A), entitles a composer of a song, 
~ s~ ishing company, to royalties from certain 
' .I\.. 
derivative works. 
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2. FACTS & DECISION BELOW: I a Congress made major 
revisions to the copyright laws. The existing copyright laws 
permitted a copyright holder to exclusive use of the work for 
two successive terms of 28 years. The revisions to the 
copyright laws provided that after January 1, 1978, new 
copyrights would generally last for the life of the author 
plus 50 years. 17 U.S.C. §302(a). Copyrights already in 
existence and in their renewal term after the Act's effective 
date were extended by adding 19 years to the 28 year renewal 
term. 17 U.S.C. §304(b). Under the revisions, if an author 
grants one or more of his statutory rights to another, or if, 
in the case of extended term copyrights, the author had 
previously made such a grant, he (or his heirs) may, subject 
to certain limitations, terminate the grant. Grants of 
copyrights to others made after the Act's effective date may 
be terminated by the author or his representative after 35 
years, 17 U.S.C. §203(a) (3), while grants made before the 
effective date of the Act may be terminated at the end of the 
28 year renewal term. Section 304(c). 
One exception to the terminat· ~ rights of copyright 
holders is that a derivative work, such as a sound recording, 
motion picture, or other creation based in part upon a pre-
---------existing copyrighted work and produced pursuant to a grant 
from the owner of that copyright may "continue to be utilized 
under the terms of the grant after its termination." Section 
304(c) (6) (A) • 1 
Footnote(s) 1 will appear on following pages. 
?7 
~ 
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/' ~ 
Resps' father, Ted Snyder, ~ o-authored and was,/'third 
owner of the copyright in the son9 "Who's Sor_r_h Now." The - ~---------
copyright was originally registered in 1923. In 1940 Snyder 
-:::-"' 
assigned his rights in the renewal term to petr, which had by 
then acquired all of the rights in the initial copyright term. 
Under the authority of that grant, petr licensed various 
record companies to create recordings of 11who 1 s Sorry Now." 
and to make and distribute copies of the sound recordings as 
phonograph records. From 1951 to 1980, the renewal term of 
the song's copyright, petr issued 419 licenses to record ------companies to use the song in a single releaseor re-release of 
a sound recording. From the period July, 1971, through June, 
1980, the licensees paid $142,633.53 in royalties, which were 
shared equally by petr and the composers. 
Resps, heirs to Synder's one-third interest in the 
copyright, exercised their right of termination. There was a 
dispute over whether petr could keep one-half of the royalties 
paid by licensee recording companies which had made recordings 
of "Who's Sorry Now," even though resps had properly exercised 
their right to terminate petr's copyright grant. 2 The DC 
1The text of 17 U.S.C. §304 (c) (6) (A) reads: 
(A) A derivative work prepared under authority of the grant 
before its termination may continue to be utilized under the 
terms of the grant after its termination, but this privilege does 
not extend to the preparation after the termination of other 
derivative works based upon the copyrighted work covered by the 
terminated grant. 
2The suit was initiated by the the Harry Fox Agency as an 
interpleader action. Fox handled the mechanics of issuing 
Footnote continued on next page. 
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ruled in petr's favor, finding that petr's right to receive 
royalties on the derivative works it licensed under its now-
extinguished authority survived resps' termination of the 
original grant from Synder to petr. The DC reasoned that the 
statutory exception to the power of termination necessarily 
carried with it the permission by the composer to the 
terminated grantee to use the terminated work. The DC viewed 
the legislative history of the provision as ambiguous, but the 
court thought that Congress had been aware of a partnership 
between composers and publishers that needed support. The DC 
concluded that petr was entitled under 17 U.S.C. §304 (c) (6) (A) 
~
to continue sharing in the royalties gained from licenses 
granted before its rights were terminated. 
The CA2 reversed. It viewed the situation as presenting 
~two separate grants ; one from Snyder to petr and a second 
grant from petr to the record companies that actually produceo 
the derivative works. The Snyder-petr grant permitted it to 
retain 50% of the net royalties actually received. The 
separate grants from petr to the record companies specified 
that the record companies were obligated to pay 100% of the 
royalties to petr. The language in the statutory exception 
stating that a derivative work "may continue to be utilized 
under the terms of the grant" referred to only the petr-record 
company grants. Petr was not a utilizer of a derivative work. 
recording licenses for petr and served as the conduit for the 
licensees' royalties to petr. 
• 
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Although the CA2 conceded that Congress did not specifically 
address this situation in enacting the 1976 Copyright Act, the 
CA2 thought that the legislative history revealed a 
Congressional intent to protect derivative users through the 
statutory exception, not publishers who acted as middlemen in 
facilitating derivative use of a copyrighted item. Congress 
also intended to benefit the creators of copyrighted works. 
Thus, while Congress did not specifically address this 
particular situation, the CA2 reasoned that its interpretation 
limiting the statutory exception to grantees utilizing a 
derivative work was consistent with congressional intent in 
passing the copyright amendments. 
3. CONTENTIONS: Petr argues that this is a case of 
first impression involving an important revision of the 1976 
Copyright Act. In the recording and film industries one 
commonly finds multiple grants of a copyright from the 
original creator of the artistic work. The CA2's decision 
essentially cuts across all intermediate grants of the 
copyright and permits the author or creator to terminate an 
extensive contractual arrangement to bring the derivative 
users into direct relationship with him. In the film 
industry, for example, the CA2's decision raises serious 
questions concerning the effect of a terminated grant on 
future uses of a film. For instance, where a film producer's 
original grant from a novelist or playright reserves to the 
producer a share of the royalties under a later grant, does 
the producer continue to share in royalties because he is a 
- -- 6 -
creator, or is he eliminated, like petr, because only the 
second grant provides for how the derivative work may be 
utilized. Many thousands of authors, publishers, and 
recording companies will be affected while the meaning of the 
termination provisions and the exception remain unsettled. 
Petr's second argument is that the plain language of the 
statutory exception applies to it. The key word in the 
statutory provision is the word "grant." Petr argues that 
this should have a single, controlling meaning and not two 
different meanings as determined by the CA. Petr argues that 
the termination from resps to petr terminated only the grant 
that the original copyright owner had given to petr. It was 
under that authority that petr had licensed the sound 
recordings in question. Under the terms of the grant from 
Snyder to petr, net royalties generated by phone records made 
from the sound recordings petr licensed were to be shared 
equally by Snyder and petr. Resps' notice of termination of 
the "grant" was addressed only to petr, and the termination 
notice did not affect the terms by which the licensed 
recording companies "utilized" the sound recordings were 
prepared under the authority of the grant to petr before its 
termination. Thus, the plain and unambiguous language of the 
statute compels the conclusion that the continued utilization 
of the recordings should result in the equal sharing of -
royalties between resps and petr. Since the statute covers 
this factual situation, it is unncessary to determine what 
Congress would have intended had it specifically and 
. . ... 
.·-
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explicitly addressed this particular situation. Petr also 
argues that the legislative history supports its conclusion 
that Congress intended to benefit a number of interests, not 
just the owners of derivative works. 
Resps take direct issue with petr's assertion that the 
motion picture industry and other entertainment businesses 
would be thrown into disarray by the CA2's decision. The vast 
majority of contractual arrangements in the entertainment 
business will be absolutely unaffected by the CA 2's decision, 
since the norm is a direct grant from the original copyright 
owner to the creator of the derivative work. The statutory 
exception explicitly applies to the typical direct grant 
situation. Only in cases in which a middleman is involved 
will this case have some significance. 
Resps also argue that although Congress did not expressly 
consider this situation, the CA's analysis of congressional 
intent is fully supported by the legislative history. It is 
quite clear that the purpose of the termination provision was 
to confer an economic benefit on authors and their heirs by 
returning to them for the 19 year extension period all rights 
that might have been previously granted to promoters at an 
earlier date, when the full value of the copyrighted works may 
not have been recognized. The derivative works exception was 
drafted to solve a particular problem under 1909 Copyright 
Act, which had been construed to prohibit utilization of 
derivative works by their owners after reversion of the 
underlying works under the old copyright renewal system. The 
.~-
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exception conferred a benefit on owners of derivative works, 
and ultimately on the public, by ensuring continued 
circulation of such works by those who have a right to utilize 
them. Middlemen's passive interest in receiving continued 
royalties is irrelevant in this situation. Finally, grantees 
such as music publishers, such as petr, have other 
ameliorative provisions in the Copyright Act to soften the 
blow of termination. 
Petr argues in reply that (1) the case has sweeping '-------
imp l i cation for the allocation of royalties in the --entertainment business. Petrs further argue that the DC's 
interpretation of the statutory exception is the only coherent 
reading of the statute, endorsed by leading authorities. See 
3M. Nimmer, Nimmer on Copyright, §ll.02[B], at 11.18.2-
11.18.3 (1983) • 3 Finally, petr argues that resp is incorrect 
in asserting that Congress was unaware of the multi-grant 
copyright relationships. The language of the exception covers 
multi-grant situations, indicating not only that derivative 
users may continue to utilize their derivative works, but that 
derivative royal t y arrangements should continue. 
4. DISCUS§ION: The question of further review at this 
point in time is a _close one. ~ itating against further 
review is the fact that there is no conflict with any other 
3Nimmer concedes that he ha entered the fray as partisan, 
filing an amicus brief in the A2 on behalf of the National Music 
Publishers Association suppa ting the District Court's decision. 
See 3 Nimmer on Copyrights §ll.02[B], at 11-18.1. 
• . f 
.•. 
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circuit on this issue, the CA2 being the first appellate court 
to address the question. Although some might also argue that 
the issue is of limited importance because the exemption 
provision affects only the 19 year extension created by 
Congress in the 1976 Act, the problems presented by this 
provision will persist for some time. 4 ·--
Weighing in favor of immediate review is the importance of _ __,. 
the question to the entertainment industries. Even if the use 
'-- --- ----- --
of a middleman to promote a song is not the prevailing norm, 
the use of an intermediary is probably common, petr asserts. 
Review now will clarify the rights of the parties in multi-
grant situations and possibly settle the lingering question, 
to whom do derivative users turn to obtain permission to make 
another use of the derivative work, such as a re-release of a 
recording, or screening of a movie on pay-television? See 3 
Nimmer on Copyrights, §11.02, at 11-18.3-18.4. Another factor 
in favor of review is the closeness of the question. While 
VN immer has chosen sides in this case, his arguments in favor 
----===-
of the DC' s interpretation §304 (C) (6) (A) are strong. Given 
that the transactions involved here demand certainty, 
immediate review will settle an important question to the 
entertainment industry. 
~-· 
4For instance, a copyrigh renewed in 1975, before the 
effective date of the Act, w s extended for another 19 years. 17 
u.s.c. §304(b). The power f termination becomes effective at 
the end of the original 2 year renewal term. Id., at 304(c). 
Conceivably, the problem presented by the exception to the 
termination power may~ sist past the end of this century. 
• r - - 10 - -
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I recommend granting the petn. -There is a response and a reply. 
2/24/84 Knudson opns in petn 
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Dear Lewis : 
Because this case came up for discussion before 
you arrived at the conference, I asked to have it 
relisted . There were two votes to grant (Byron and 
me}, and two join three's , (your and Harry} . Both the 
importance of the issue and the apparent injustice to 
the ow er of the c i persuaded me that 1t might 
be the kind of case that would strike you as 
certworthy. I am by no means pressing you to vote to 
grant, but merely felt that the possibi · r nt 
should not slip by because of your emporary absence at 
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No. 83-1153, Mills Music, Inc. v. Snyder, et al • 
Memorandum for File 
This is a summary memorandum on the basis of a preliminary 
reading of the briefs. 
The Parties and Terms 
In light of my unfamiliarity with Copyright Law, this 
case is not easy to understand. Nor do I find the opinions 
below or the briefs (by strong counsel on both sides) easily 
absorbed on a first reading. This memo will merely be a starting 
point for me when - with the help of a bench memo - I prepare for 
the argument. 
This case involves a quarrel over the copyright to the song 
"Who's Sorry Now?". In the music industry, the composer or author 
of a song usually assigns his copyright to a "publisher". Under 
the assignment, the publisher issues licenses to record companies 
known as "record producers" . These producers apparently make the 
records and market them. They pay royalties to the publisher 
who shares the royalties on a 50-50 basis with the composer. 
The parties: The petitioner Mills Music, Inc. is the 
"publisher" of the Song. Ted Snyder was one of the three com-
posers. Respondents here are his widow and Ted Snyder, Jr. 
who - as the composer's heirs inherited his one-third interest 
in the Song - an interest that had been assigned to Mills. 
(The Harry Fox agency had acted as agent for Mills, but 




No. 83-1153 2. 
This action was commenced as an "interpleader" brought 
by Fox to resolve a dispute between the Snyders and Mills 
Music concerning rights in the Song. Though the amount in 
controversy here is small, CA 2 stated that substantial sums in 
future royalties in the music, literary, and movie world 
will be affected by our decision. There is no dispute as to 
the facts. The only question is one of statutory construction 
as to the meaning of certain provisions of the 1976 Amendments 
to the Copyright Act (The Act). The case was decided by 
Judge Weinfeld on cross-summary motions. CA 2 unanimously 
reversed in an opinion by Judge Oaks. Although I am frank to 
say I do not fully understand these opinions at this time, my 
impression is that both are well written and reflect a comprehen-
sion of Copyright Law that I envy (at least for purposes of this 
case) . 
The Act (Adopted in 1976 and Effective 1978) 
The Act extended existing copyrights, including the Song, 
by 19 years to a total of 75 years from the date of copyright. 
It provided that the composer or his successors may "terminate" 
previous grants and recapture all rights in the copyright for 
this 19 years extension. See §304(c). It expressly protected 
the composer and his heirs by providing that the "termination of 
the grant may be effected notwithstanding any agreement to the 
contrary ... ". §304(c) (5). But a proviso created an exception 
• 
- -
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to the recapture provision for "derivative works". Jfy under-
standing is that this term includes the recording (on a record 
or tape} of a copyrighted song. The Exception is known as the 
"derivative works exception". 
The respondents (Snyders) exercised their right to terminate 
the assignment of the one-third interest to Mills. They did so at 
the beginning of the 19 year extension period as of its effective 
date, January 3, 1980. The DC held that the notice of termination 
was in proper form and operated to terminate the grant to Mills 
of a one-third interest in the renewal copyright in the Song. 
The termination, however, was subject to the applicability of 
the Exception . 
The DC held that the Exception preserved Mills' rights, 
as publisher, to share Song royalties from recordings made by 
record producers who had been licensed by Mills as publisher. 
Although CA 2 recognized that "reasonable persons" could disagree 
as to the construction of the statute, it reversed the DC. 
I will not address the statutory language in this memo. 
My understanding, stated simply, is that there are three levels 
of interest: First, the composer (Snyders); second, the publisher 
(Mills) who issued licenses to scores of record producers; and 
finally the producers. 
• 
- -
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The Court of Appeals held that the only exception to the 
composer's right to terminate prior grants of copyright, and 
thereby recapture a right to the royalties, is the Exception 
that permits continued use of a "derivative work" by its 
owner. The derivative work, as noted above, is the making of 
recordings of the Song. 
The Court of Appeals concluded that the purpose of the 
Exception was to insure continued public access to derivative 
works - i.e. the recordings of the Song - by giving the record 
producers (the owners of the derivative works) the right to 
continue utilizing them. 
Apparently Mills concedes that it never owned any interest 
in the sound recordings that were made by its licensees (the 
producers). Under the holding of CA 2, as a result of the 
exercise by the Snyders of the termination rights, they will 
receive 100 percent of the royalties from records sold over 
the 19 years of the extended period. Mills no longer will be 
entitled to receive any royalties. CA 2 held its 50 percent 
interest was "terminated". According to CA 2 and respondents, 
there no intention is evidenced in the legislative history of 
the Amended Act to benefit "middlemen" like Mills. The purposes 
were to reinstate copyright ownership (right to royalties) in the 
composer, and protect the public interest in being able to 
purchase the records from the producers who had been licensed 
by Mills. As a publisher, Mills was a "middle-man" who had 
assigned his interest to the producers. 
- -
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* * * 
At the moment, I am not even sure I fully understand the 
case, and I have made no attempt to review the portions of the 
legislative history included in the briefs. I am inclined to 
think, however, that CA 2's opinion probably is right. 
LFP 
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No. 83-1153, Mills Music, Inc. v. Snyder .L/d(C/l'ZJ) 
{lrl-2. ~£;-G- ~ /.v'~ 
Question Presented 
~~ 
Does the derivative works exception to the terminat fon /~ 
of transfers provision of the Copyright Act of 19-=H> app ~ 
~4--t-~ 
music publisher who received the original grant of copyright ~ 
renewal rights in a song and who licensed the preparation of 




A. Statutory Background 
In 1976, Congress enacted a major revision of the 
copyright law, which, among other things, fundamentally redefined -----
the duration of copyrights. In place of the prior law's ------
provision for a term of 28 years followed by a renewal term of 
the same duration, the 1976 Act provided that new copyrights 
~' 
would extend for the nlife of the author plus 50 years. 17 u.s.c. 





by adding 19 years to the renewal term. §304 (b). The ~I.A~ -------- ~~ 
establishment of this new term for old copyrights in effect ~ 
created new interests in property that had for the most part been •~ · 
disposed of long ago. 
·f,r,.• ... df 2 1 
~~ 
"d f h ' h . ~~ e ctio~ prov1 es or t e allocation oft ese new ~ 
/-, ~ 
property interests. Pursuant to that section, an author (or his 
heirs) who had transferred rights in a copyright prior to 1978 
has the option of recapturing them by terminating the grant after ------- '---------------
the end of the 28-year renewal term. 1 After termination, all of 
the previously transferred rights revert to the author or his 
heirs for the 19-year extension, subject to certain exceptions 
enumerated in §304. du.f 
The scope of one such exception, the so-called ~ L-1,., 
l l 
"derivative works exception"' of §304 (c) (6) (A) (hereinafter ~ - ~~ ~-----------------✓ 
1This termination right ~xi~ ts regardless of any a g reement to 




"Exception"} , is the subject of th is lawsuit. 
provides as follows: 
That subsection 
(6) ••• In the case of a grant executed by one or 
more of the authors of the work, all of a particular 
author's rights under this title that were covered by 
the terminated grant revert, upon the effective date of 
termination, to that author or, if that author is dead, 
to the persons owning his or her termination interest 
under clause (2) of this subsection • . • • In all 
cases the reversion of rights is subject to the 
following limitations: 
(A} A derivative work prepared under authority of 
the grant before its termination may continue to be 
utilized under the terms of the grant after its 
termination, but this privilege does not extend to 
the preparation after the termination of ~ other 
derivative works based upon the copyrighted work 
covered by the terminated grant. 
I l \.' 
A "der i va ti ve work" is defined in §101 of the Act as "a work 
~
1/ ~ 
based upon one or more preexisting works, such as a translation, 
It • '' I t, • • '\ musical arrangement, aramat1zat1on, fictionalization, motion 
picture version, sound recording, art reproduction, abridgment, 
condensation, or any other form in which a work may be recast, 
transformed, or adapted." In short, where a work based upon Ct!~ 
copyrighted material contains sufficient modifications of 
original that it represents a separate original work 







Ted Snyder, the late husband and father, respectively, 
r::; I '.1iC l'.e-:-
of respondents Marie and Ted Snyder, Jr., co-authored the popular 
... - --
song "Who's Sorry Now." The copyright was originally registered 
in 1923: in 1940, Snyder assigned all of his rights in the 
- • 
4. 
renewal term of the copyright (hereinafter "the Snyder-Mills 
grant") to petr, which had by then acquired all rights in the ----initial term. That grant provided that petr would pay to Snyder 
fifty percent of all net royalties received by petr from the 
mechanical reproduction of the song on phonograph records. 
Petr licensed various record companies over the years 
to produce sound recordings of the song and to make and 
distribute phonograph records of the recordings. Each 1 icensee 
paid a stated royalty for each phonograph record it made and 
sold; in compliance with the terms of the Snyder-Mills grant, 
petr paid Snyder half of the net royalties it received. 
Resps inher i tea Snyder's interest in the copyright of 
the song and, pursuant to §304 (c) of the Act, exercised their 
,---
right to terminate the Snyder-Mills grant. The Notice of 
Termination applied to the "[g]rant or transfer of copyright and 
the rights of copyright proprietor, including publication and 
recording rights." See Joint App. at 54. This case arose from a 
dispute over who was to be paid the royalties received after 
termination from sound recordings licensed before termination of 
the Snyder-Mills grant. 
C. Decisions Below 
The Harry Fox Agency, Inc. ("Fox") , who for years ac tea 
on petr's behalf in issuing licenses for mechanical recordings of 
✓ 
the song, filed an interpleader action in SONY (Weinfeld, J.) to 










ruled for petr. 543 F. Supp. 844. 
Beg inning with the Exception's language, the DC found 
that it could be read as covering petr's interest consistent with 
the purposes of the Act. After conducting an extensive review 
of the Exception's legislative history, the court found that it 
was simply unhelpful. It concluded that Congress had not 
considered the Exception in light of the situation presented here 
in which a music publisher acts as a middleman licensor between 
the author of the original copyrighted work and the creators of 
the derivative works, but instead had focused on the case in 
which the author transferred his rights directly to the creator 
of the derivative work. Because it had found that its 
construction of the statute's language was consistent with the 
Act's purposes, however, DC was not concerned by the void in the 
legislative history. Finding that resps' proposed interpretation 
• 
of the statutory language, in contrast, constituted a "tortured" 
reading of the statute in order to exclude petr, DC concluded 
that petr should continue to share in royalties for derivative 






CA2 (Oakes, Cardamone, and Pierce, JJ.) reversed. 720 (' A "2-
F. 2d 733. Acknowledging that "the matter is one on which 
reasonable minds may well differ," and that Congress did not 
specifically address the situation in which the grantee from the 
author has licensed third parties to use the copyright, CA2 set 
forth three propositions from which it began its analysis: (1) 





its claim to the royalties, (2) that petr is not a utilizer of a 
derivative work, and (3) that the statute does not specifically 
address the situation here of a grant of rights to use the 
derivative work by the author's grantee. From these 
propositions, CA2 concluded that petr may not share in the 




The one thing tha0 lear about this case is that 
is no "right" answer. A look at the legislative history ---------------
convinces me that Congress did not expressly consider the multi-
grant situation in enacting the Exception, and the statutory ______, 







or resps'. I can find more 








position than I can for resps•, 2 and therefore, I recommend that 
you vote to reverse. Eitner way, however, there will be portions 11~ 
~
of the language that do not mesh perfectly with the argument.  
A. The Statutory Language 
As the DC noted, the starting point in a question of 
2 rn addition, Professor ~ mmer agrees with petr's construction 
of the language, although he discloses that he filed a brief on 
behalf of the National Music Publishers Associa~ cus 
curiae in CA2. See 3M. Nimmer, Nimmer on Copyright §ll.02[B], 
at 11-18.1 to 11-18.3 (1983). 
- • 
7. 
statutory construction is the statutory language itself. Ernst & 
Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 197 {1976). The parties' 
w-t-.:1--i--£-
dispute over the language centers primarily on what is meant by ~ 
/~~ ... · the term "grant" as used in the Exception. ~ 7 , -~ · 
Looking at the language of both subsection (6) of §304 
and the Exception, it is plain that both provisions speak in ~ 
terms of only one grant--the grant that has been terminated -=---~ ... 
~ 
by ~ 
the author. Subsection (6) states that "all of a particular 
author's rights • . . that were covered by the terminated grant 
revert" to him or his heirs, subject to certain enumerated 
limitations, including the Exception. Similarly, the language of 
the Exception, stating that "[a] derivative work prepared under 
authority of the grant before its termination may continue to be 
utilized under the terms of the grant after its termination," may 
logically refer only to the Snyder-Mills grant, which was the 
only grant that was terminated. 
This plain language refutes resps' contention that 
while "grant" in subsection (6) refers to the Snyder-Mills grant, 
"grant" in the Exception refers to the terms of the licenses 
granted by petr to the licensees. Those licenses were never 
terminated. Moreover, there is nothing in the language to justify 
resps' contention that the effect of subsection (6) is to 
terminate the Snyder-Mills grant, thereby placing resps in petr's 
shoes as to the licensees, so that the Exception means that the 
derivative works "may continue to be utilized" under the terms of 




Resps continue their argument based on their 
interpretation of "grant" in the Exception by contending that 
because it refers to the license grants, the Exception is 
irrelevant to the question of who, as between the parties to the 
terminated Snyder-Mills grant, receives the royalties from 
preexisting derivative works. A reading of subsection {6) and 
the Exception together as related parts of §304, however, refutes 
this contention. As noted above, subsection {6) states that "all -
of a particular author's rights . . . that were covered by the 
terminated grant revert [to him or his heirs] . • . subject to 
the following limitations," including the Exception. By its 
terms, then, the Exception is a limitation upon the rights of the ..-
author or his heirs as to preexisting derivative works. The -
right to receive royalties is, as this lawsuit demonstrates, one 
of the rights that authors and their heirs are most concerned 
about under the termination provisions of the new Act. 
Therefore, it cannot be correct to read the Exception as 
irrelevant to the question of who receives the royalties after 
termination. 
Emphasizing the "may continue to be utilized" language, 
resps instead would read the Exception as focusing upon the 
identity of the utilizer of the derivative work. As noted above, 
a.. ~1-~1,,. 
however, the structure of §304 demonstrates that the Exception is ~ ~~ 
a limitation upon the rights of the author; it is not a P'f ~ 
~
restriction on the rights of the publisher, or of the derivative 




interested party. The question of who may utilize the derivative / 
works is simply never put into focus by the Exception's language. 
Nonetheless, resps argue that petr 's construction of ~ 
the Except ion does not work because the Exception refers to ~ 
"utiliz [ation] under the terms of the grant," and the Snyder-
Mills grant does not contain provisions governing the utilization 
of derivative works. Resps claim that only the licenses issued 
by petr to the derivative work owners provide for utilization 
within the meaning of the Exception, and therefore, that "grant" 
must refer to the licenses. Resps find content for their 
interpretation of "utilization" in §106 of the Act, which 
contains a list of the things an owner has the exclusive right to 
"do and to authorize" with respect to his copyright, including 
preparing derivative works and distributing copies or 
phonorecords of the copyrighted work. Resps conclude from this 
that "utilization" engenders an obligation to pay royalties, not 
to collect them, as petr does; that therefore, petr cannot be a 
"utilizer" within the meaning of the Exception; and that 
consequently, the Exception does not apply to petr and parties in 
its position. 
There are several flaws in ~ : rgument. One is that 
resps neglect to quote the entire phrase from the Exception: 
"utiliz[ation] under the terms of the grant after its 
termination." As noted above, "grant" in this phrase must 
logically refer to the terminated Snyder-Mills grant. 
Second, there is no justification for defining 
"utilize" as narrowly as resps do. The only list of defined 
- -
10. 
terms in the Act is contained in §101; "utilization" is not among 
them. The validity of referring to §106 for the content of the 
term is dubious, since that section does not ever employ the term 
"utilize." 
Third, resps cite no authority whatsoever for their "h.-6J 
~ 
theory that "utilization" engenders an obligation to pay, but not -- -to collect, royalties. Although far from dispositive, a -
statement in the Senate Report suggests the opposite: that 
"utilize" within the meaning of §203 (b) (1) 3 of the Act may 
include the continued right to license the performance of a 
derivative work, as petr licenses the use of derivative works. 
See s. Rep. No. 473, at 111, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. (1975) 
(hereinafter "S. Rep."). Accord H.R. Rep. No. 1476, at 127, 94th 
Cong., 2d Sess. ( 1976) (hereinafter "H. R. Rep.") • Cf. Hearings 
Before the Subcomm. on Courts, Civil Liberties, and the 
Administration of Justice of the Comm. on the Judiciary on H.R. 
2223, Copyright Law Revision, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 106 (1975) 
(hereinafter "Hearings") (" [E] veryone bes ides the author is a 
user of the author's work."). 
Finally, as noted above, the recognition that the 
Exception is a limitation on authors' rights makes the identity 
3section 203 (b) (1) provides for the termination of grants 
executed on or after January 1, 1978, and contains a derivative 
works exception identical to that in §304 (c) (6) (A). The 
legislative history indicates that the two termination provisions 
and derivative works exceptions were intended to be applied in 
substantially the same way; therefore, the legislative history of 
§203 (b) (1) is a valid source for discovering the import of the 




of the utilizer of the derivative work much less central to 
ascertaining the import of the Exception. Under this view of the 
statute, a broader reading of the "utilization" language permits 
the following reasonable interpretation: even though the Snyder- ~•s - -- - -- ~I-a-~ 
Mills grant does not provide guidelines for the utilization of 
specified derivative works, the derivative works "may continue to 
be utilized under the terms of the grant after its termination" 
in the sense that rights in preexisting derivative works are not 
altered by the termination, as are rights in the underlying 
copyright and rights to make new derivative works based on that 
copyright. The old derivative works remain in the public domain 
as previously created and distributed, and the termination gives 
the author no more interest in those works than he otherwise 
~
would have had: he is entitled to fifty percent of the net 
royalties from those derivative works, just as before, but he may 
=-- -
not cut off the right to use such a derivative work, relicense 
the right to use the underlying work in an already existing 
derivative work, or otherwise interfere with the utilization of 
the derivative work in a way that was not originally provided for 
in the terminated grant. 
Resps also contend that the construction of "grant" as 
referring to the Snyder-Mills grant does not work because 
existing derivative works were not "prepared under authority of 
the grant before its termination," but under the authority of the 
licenses issued by petr to the derivative work owners. Resps' 
contention is correct in the limited sense that the Snyder-Mills 





distribution of the derivative works in question here. However, 
the works were prepared under the authority of the Snyder-Mills 
grant in the sense that in that grant, Snyder ceded the rights to 
use the underlying copyright, which was a necessary grant of 
authority before the derivative works could be prepared. 
In sum, the construction of the statutory language ~ 
offered above covers petr 's case without doing violence to the 
language as written, although §304(c) (6) (A) concededly does not 
read as though it were written with petr's position in mind. As 
discussed below, I believe this construction also is consistent 
with the purposes underlying the Exception and the Act as a 
whole. Resps' construction of the language, in contrast, 
focusing on the meaning of "utilization" and the identity of the 
utilizer of derivative works, would require the Court both to 
read into the Exception a definition of "utilization" for which 
there is no basis in the statute, and to read out of the 
Exception the language expressly stating that "grant" means the -grant that was terminated, rather than the licenses granted from 
Apetr to the licensees • 
. ~ ,, ·- - • . • I . 11--~ ?~/.r,~ 
B. The Purposes of the Act and the Exception ~::~"° ft> 
Although as noted above, the legislative history is ~ 1 ''--
"'----devoid of any indication that Congress had the multi-grant ...,....,..,,,~ 
situation specifically in mind when it enacted the Exception, the 
history does reveal that the purposes of the Exception and the 




share in the royal ties in question here. The Hearings on H. R. 
2223 reveal that the ~ mary concern3 of the drafters were to 
encourage the dissemination of works for profit--benefitting 
----------------------- -
creators, producers, and disseminators of derivative works--while 
_.... - - =:::. 
at the same time protecting the rights of authors of original 
copyrighted works. It was perceived that both of these goals 
would further a third purpose of - --- the Act of maximizin~ the public's access to creative works. The public would have 
available to it more existing works if the Act encouraged 
investment in the dissemination of both original and derivative 
works. By the same token, the public would have available more 
new works if the Act also protected the rights of authors of 
' 
original copyrighted works. See Hearings, at 106, 116-117. 
The history of the Exception reflects a similar 
recognition of the diverse interests involved and a concern with 
attempting to accommodate them all. For example, the Senate 
Report recognized that the termination provisions of §§203 and 
304 were necessary to safeguard the author from previous 
unremunerative transfers he might have made. See S. Rep. at 108. 
At the same time, the Congress acknowledged that other parties 
also had a legitimate interest in the new property right that was 
being created by the 19-year extension. Consequently, the 
legislative history consistently speaks of reaching i~ §§203 and 
304 a "practical compromise that will .recogniz[e] the 
problems and legitimate needs of all interests involved," id., 






the reversionary provisions, id., at 123. Accord H.R. Rep., at 
124, 140. 
Thus, r ~ • contention that petrs should be denied any ----, 
rights in royalties from preexisting derivative works because 
"the [E]xception has a specific and limited purpose [that is to] 
guarante[e] public access to derivative works after termination," 
Resps' Brief at 20, misses the point of the legislative history 
as a whole. If anything, the purposes of the Act and the 
'- - -~ 
Exception as described above point toward permitting petr to 
e ' 
t . h 1 . f 
11 . • '\d . . k con 1nue to s are roya ties or preex1st1ng er1vat1ve wor s to -----~,_. ~~ ,,,....., ,,,..._,__ 
encourage others to invest in the dissemination of original works ---- __, ------------------------------------
as petr did • 
Resp contends that the legislative history shows that 
the Exception was not meant to apply to the music publishing 
industry but only to motion pictures, and thus, that petr should 
be excluded from whatever benefit the Exception provides. This 
represents a much too narrow view. Although the legislative 
history uses the example of motion picture pro9ucers in 
discussing the meaning of the Exception, there is no indication 
in either the language or the legislative history that Congress 
intended to limit the Exception's applicability to the motion 
picture industry. The Exception refers to "derivative works," a 
defined term in §101 of the Act whose meaning is not limited to 
motion pictures. A defined term generally must be given its 
stated meaning throughout the Act, absent evidence of an express 
intent to limit its meaning in a particular context. See Walling 
v. Portland Terminal Co., 330 U.S. 148, 150-151 (1947). There is 
- -
15. 
evidence in other contexts in the legislative history that 
Congress was aware of the situation of music publishers and the 
existence of other types of derivative works that would be 
affected by the Exception. Consequently, there is no clear 
justification for excluding music publishers in petr 's position 
from the operation of the Exception. 
Resp argues that there was an agreement between all 
members of the industry during the drafting sessions before the 
bill was submitted to Congress that music publishers were to be 
cut out of the operation of the Exception. Resp cites no 





and as the DC noted, it is therefore irrelevant to wha'{t-~ 
~~e. -
Congress's intent was in enacting the Exception. ~ --/2 
Finally, resp argues that the sole purpose of the ~~6-
Exception was to overrule existing law that held that once a ~ 
copyright term ended, rights to utilize any derivative works 
ceased absent specific approval of such continued use by the 
author of the underlying copyright. From this proposition, which 
is correct as far as it goes, resps argue that the Exception had 
no purpose to protect middlemen such as petr, because once the 
preparation of a derivative work is licensed, such middlemen play 
no role in either the utilization or dissemination of the work. 4 
4Resps also argue that permitting petr to share in the 
royalties gives petr a windfall because it never bargained for 
the rights as to the 19-year extension and because Congress 
intended to get rid of grants that purported to control post-
termination rights. The legislative history cited above, 
however, shows that Congress recognized that it was creating a 
Footnote continued on next page. 
- -
16. 
The Exception was intended, in part, to overrule 
~ , 
existing law that had held that rights to utilize derivative 
works could be cut off by the end of the copyright term of the 
underlying work. And, as discussed at page 11, supra, the 
Exception accomplishes this purpose by providing that an author 
has no more rights after termination as to existing derivative 
works than he did before termination. To deduce from this, 
however, that the Exception had no purpose to benefit music 
publishers such as petr is to fail to take account of Congress's 
recognition of the existence of many diverse interests in the 
reversion of rights at the point of termination and the benefit 
to be gained in accommodating them all. As noted above, it is 
true that the Exception was designed to promote continued access 
to preexisting derivative works. It is also true that once a 
derivative work is created, publishers such as petr have no 
further role in the dissemination of that work. It cannot be 
denied, however, that publishers such as petr, by licensing the 
use of an original work, play an important role in dissemination. 
Congress was aware of the need to encourage future investment in 
the dissemination of creative work, and it is therefore 
consistent with the purposes of the Act and the Exception to 
permit petr to share in royal ties from past licenses so that 
others will be encouraged to participate in the dissemination 
new property interest, the rights to which would have to be 
allocated by the statute in a way that would fairly accommodate 
the varied interests involved, regardless of previous bargains. 
- -
17. 















situation presented by this case in mind when it enacted the 
derivative works exceptio~ there is no indication that Congress 
intended to exclude middlemen such as petr from the operation of 
-----------------'""IL..--- -
the Exception. The Exception was written to apply to all types 
of derivative works, an~ here is evidence that Congress was 
aware of the music industry and the role of music publishers such 
~~~~ 
as petr. The ~construction of the language offered above 
accommodates this case in a manner that is consistent with the 
purposes of the Act and the Exception, without doing the violence 
to the statutory language that the contrary interpretation 
compels. Consequently, I recommend that you vote to reverse. 
·~ 
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From: Justice Stevens 
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1st DRAFT 
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 
No. 83-1153 
MILLS MUSIC, INC., PETITIONER v. MARIE SNYDER 
AND TED SNYDER, JR., ETC. 
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF 
APPEALS FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT 
[December--, 1984] 
JUSTICE STEVENS delivered the opinion of the Court. 
This is a controversy between a publisher, Mills Music, 
Inc. (Mills), and the heirs of an author, Ted Snyder (Snyder), 
over the division of royalty income that the sound recordings 
of the copyrighted song "Who's Sorry Now" (the Song) have 
generated. The controversy is a direct outgrowth of the 
General Revision of Copyright Law that Congress enacted in 
1976. 1 The 1976 Act gave Snyder's heirs a statutory right to 
reacquire the copyright 2 that Snyder had previously granted 
to Mills; however, it also provided that a "derivative work 
prepared under authority of the grant before its termination 
may continue to be utilized under the terms of the grant after 
its termination." 3 The sound recordings of the Song, which 
have generated the royalty income in dispute, are derivative 
works of that kind. 4 Thus, the dispute raises the question 
1 See 17 U. S. C. §§ 101-810. The 1976 Act generally became effective 
on January 1, 1978. 
' Id. , at § 304(c)(2). 
3 Id., at § 304(c)(6)(A). The full text of this provision is quoted infra, at 
n. 5. 
• The 1976 Act defines a "derivative work" as follows: 
"A 'derivative work' is a work based upon one or more preexisting works, 
such as a translation, musical arrangement, dramatization, fictionalization, 
motion picture version, sound recording, art reproduction, abridgement, 
condensation, or any other form in which a work may be recast, trans-
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whether an author's termination of a publisher's interest in a 
copyright also terminates the publisher's contractual right to 
share in the royalties on such derivative works. 
The key that will unlock this statutory puzzle is an under-
standing of the phrase "under the terms of the grant" as it is 
used in§ 304(c)(6)(A}-the so-called "derivative works excep-
tion" (the Exception) to the "termination of transfer and li-
censes" provisions found in § 304 of the 1976 Act. 5 Before 
focusing on the meaning of the key phrase, we shall describe 
the chain of title to the copyright, the circumstances sur-
elaborations, or other modifications which, as a whole, represent an origi-
nal work of authorship, is a 'derivative work.'" 17 U. S. C. § 101. 
A sound recording is generally fixed on a master, and then embodied and 
distributed on phonorecords. The 1976 Act distinguishes "sound record-
ings" from "phonorecords.'' The former are defined as follows: 
" 'Sound recordings' are works that result from the fixation of a series of 
musical, spoken, or other sounds, but not including the sound accompany-
ing a motion picture or other audiovisual work, regardless of the nature of 
the material objects, such as disks, tapes, or other phonorecords, in which 
they are embodied." Ibid. 
In contrast, the 1976 Act provides the follwoing definition of "phono-
records": 
"'Phonorecords' are material objects in which sounds, other than those ac-
companying a motion picture or other audiovisual work, are fixed by any 
method now known or later developed, and from which the sounds can be 
perceived, reproduced, or otherwise communicated, either directly or with 
the aid of a machine or device. The term 'phonorecords' includes the ma-
terial object in which the sounds are first fixed.'' Ibid. 
Moreover, "[a] work is 'fixed' in a tangible medium of expression when its 
embodiment in a copy or phonorecord, by or under the authority of the au-
thor, is sufficiently permanent or stable to permit it to be perceived, repro-
duced, or otherwise communicated for a period of more than transitory du-
ration.'' Ibid. 
• The Exception reads as follows: 
"A derivative work prepared under authority of the grant before its termi-
nation may continue to be utilized under the terms of the grant after its 
termination, but this privilege does not extend to the preparation after the 
termination of other derivative works based upon the copyrighted work 
covered by the terminated grant." 17 U. S. C. § 304(c)(6)(A). 
-
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3 
rounding Congress' adoption of the 1976 Act, and how the 
pertinent provisions of the 1976 Act affected the relationship 
among the interested parties in 1978 when Snyder's heirs ter-
minated the grant to Mills. We begin with the early factual 
history. 
I 
Ted Snyder was one of three persons who collaborated in 
creating "Who's Sorry Now." 6 Although Snyder actually 
held only a one-third interest in the Song, the parties agree 
that we should treat the case as if Snyder were the sole au-
thor. The original copyright on the Song was registered in 
1923 in the name of Waterson, Berlin & Snyder, a publishing 
company that Snyder partly owned. 7 That company went 
into bankruptcy in 1929, and in 1932 the trustee in bank-
ruptcy assigned the copyright to Mills. 8 
Under the Copyright Act of 1909, 35 Stat. 1075, the copy-
right in a musical composition lasted for 28 years from the 
date of its first publication, and the author could renew the 
copyright for an additional term of 28 years. 9 Although 
Mills had acquired ownership of the original copyright from 
the trustee in bankruptcy, it needed the cooperation of Sny-
der in order to acquire an interest in the 28-year renewal 
term. Accordingly, in 1940 Mills and Snyder entered into a 
written agreement defining their respective rights in the re-
newal of the copyright. In essence, Snyder assigned his en-
tire interest in all renewals of the copyright to Mills in ex-
change for an advance royalty and Mills' commitment to pay a 
6 Snyder composed the music, and Burt Kalmar and Harry Ruby wrote 
the words. App. 52. 
1 Id., at 49. 
8 ld., at 38. 
9 The renewal application had to be filed before the expiration of the 
original term. If the author predeceased the last year of the first 28-year 
term, certain statutory successors could accomplish renewal. 17 U. S. C. 
§ 24 (1976 ed.) (1909 Act); see also Fisher Co. v. Whitmark & Sons, 318 
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cash royalty on sheet music and 50 percent of all net royalties 
that Mills received for mechanical reproductions. 10 
Mills obtained and registered the renewal copyright in 
1951. After filing the required statutory notice, 11 Mills di-
rectly, or through the Harry Fox Agency, Inc., issued over 
400 licenses to record companies authorizing the use of the 
Song in specific reproductions on phonograph records. Us-
ing a variety of different artists and different musical ar-
10 The agreement, which Snyder and respondent Marie Snyder signed, 
covered Snyder's entire catalogue of songs. It provided, in part: 
"In part consideration hereof, I further covenant and agree promptly to 
apply for renewal copyrights on all of my compositions which from time to 
time may hereafter fall due and are now part of your [Mills'] catalogue, 
whether I was the sole author thereof or collaborated with others and 
which vest in me the right to make copyright applications on all such com-
positions as provided by the United States Copyright. Act and in which I 
have any right, title and interest or control whatsoever, in whole or in 
part, and I further covenant and agree with you to stand seized and pos-
sessed of all such renewal copyrights and of all applications thereof, and of 
all rights in or to any such compositions for you and for your sole and exclu-
sive benefit . . . . I further agree that when such renewal copyrights are 
duly issued and obtained they shall automatically become vested in you as 
the sole owner thereof, and your successors and assigns. 
"After first deducting all advance royalties heretofore paid as above pro-
vided for, and any other sums that may have been advanced to me under 
the terms of this agreement, the following royalties shall be payable to me 
during your customary semi-annual royalty period each year, as follows: 
three (3¢) cents per copy upon each and every regular pianoforte copy, and 
two (2¢) cents per copy for each orchestration sold, paid for and not re-
turned by virtue of the rights herein acquired, and a sum equal to fifty 
(50%) per cent of all net royalties actually received by you for the mechani-
cal reproduction of said musical compositions on player-piano rolls, phono-
graph records, disks or any other form of mechanical reproduction, for li-
censes issued under said renewal copyrights .... " App. 41-42. 
This agreement, of course, predated this Court's decision in Fisher Co. v. 
Whitmark & Sons, supra, which held that the 1909 Act did not prevent an 
author from assigning his interest in the renewal copyright before he had 
secured it. Id. , at 657. 
11 See 17 U. S. C. § l (e) (1976 ed.) (1909 Act). Mills filed the required 
notice with the Copyright Office in 1958. App. 52. 
-
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rangements, these record companies prepared separate "de-
rivative works," each of which was independently copy-
rightable. 12 Because each of these derivative works was a 
mechanical reproduction of the Song that was prepared pur-
suant to a license that Mills had issued, the record companies 
were contractually obligated to pay royalties to Mills and 
Mills, in turn, was contractually obligated to pay 50 percent 
of those royalties to Snyder. 13 Fox acted as an agent for 
Mills, performing the service of collecting royalties from the 
licensed record companies and, after deducting its charges, 
remitting the net receipts to Mills, which in turn remitted 50 
percent of that income to Snyder. After Snyder's death, his 
widow and his son succeeded to his interest in the arrange-
ment with Mills. 
II 
The massive work necessary for the general revision of the 
copyright law began in 1955, perhaps stimulated in part by 
this country's help in the development of, and subsequent 
membership in, the Universal Copyright Convention. 14 In 
that year, Congress approved several appropriations for the 
Copyright Office. The Copyright Office then began building 
the foundation for the general revision by authorizing a series 
of 34 studies on major issues of copyright law; these studies 
were published and included in the legislative history. 15 
After issuing a report in 1961, the Copyright Office con-
ducted numerous meetings with representatives of the many 
12 17 U. S. C. § 103(b); 17 U.S. C. §7 (1976 ed. ) (1909 Act). The record 
reveals separate licenses for renditions of the Song by artists such as Judy 
Garland and Liza Minelli, and Nat King Cole. App. 22, 81. 
13 See n. 10, supra. 
1
• House Judiciary Committee, Copyrights Act, H. R. Rep. No. 1476, 
94th Cong., 2d Sess. 47. Several earlier copyright law revisions had failed 
"partly because of controversy among private interests over differences 
between the Berne Convention and the U. S. law." Ibid. 
15 See Studies Prepared for the Subcommittee on Patents, Trademarks, 
and Copyrights of the Committee on the Judiciary, 86th Cong., 1st & 2d 




MILLS MUSIC, INC. v. SNYDER 
-
parties that the copyright law affected. 16 In 1964, the Copy-
right Office issued a preliminary draft revision bill, which 
contained the essence of the Exception before the Court to-
day. 17 Additional discussions with interested parties fol-
lowed. 18 Two additional draft revision bills supervened, both 
containing the Exception. 19 Interested parties submitted 
commentary following the 1964 draft revision bill. 20 
Congress began its lengthy hearings after the Copyright 
Office submitted the 1965 draft revision bill. 21 The hearings 
on the 1965 bill occupied over three weeks during a three-
month period and involved well over 100 witnesses. More-
18 H. R. Rep. No. 1476, supra, at 47. See Report of the Register of the 
Copyrights on the General Revision of the U. S. Copyright Law, 87th 
Cong., 1st Sess., Copyright Law Revision (H. Judiciary Comm. Print 
1961); Discussion and Comments on Report of the Register of Copyrights 
on the General Revision of U. S. Copyright Law, 88th Cong., 1st Sess., 
Copyright Law Revision, Part 2 (H. Judiciary Comm. Print 1963). 
17 Preliminary Draft for Revised U. S. Copyright Law and Discussions 
and Comments on the Draft, 88th Cong., 2d Sess., Copyright Law Revi-
sion, Part 3, at 16 (Alternative A), 21 (H. Judiciary Comm. Print 1964). 
The twin citations here and elsewhere refer to the derivative-works excep-
tion that is now codified at § 304(c)(6)(A) and refer to a similar derivative-
works exception that is now codified at 17 U. S. C. § 203(b)(l). We have 
examined the development of both sections for purposes of this opinion. 
18 See Further Discussions and Comments on Preliminary Draft for Re-
vised U. S. Copyright Law, 88th Cong., 2d Sess., Copyright Law Revi-
sion, Part 4 (H. Judiciary Comm. Print 1964). 
19 See H. R. 11947, 88th Cong., 2d Sess., §§ 16(b)(l), 22(c)(3)(A) (1964) 
(1964 draft revision bill); S. 3008, 88th Cong., 2d Sess., §§ 16(b)(l), 
22(c)(3)(A) (1964) (1964 draft revision bill); H. R. 4347, 89th Cong., 1st & 
2d Sess., §§ 203(b)(l), 304(c)(5)(A) (1965) (1965 draft revision bill); S. 1006, 
89th Cong., 1st Sess., §§ 203(b)(l), 304(c)(5)(A) (1965) (1965 draft revision 
bill). 
20 See 1964 Revision Bill with Discussions and Comments, 89th Cong., 
1st Sess., Copyright Law Revision, Part 5 (H. Judiciary Comm. Print 
1965). 
21 Hearings on H. R. 4347, 5680, 6831, 6835 Before Subcomm. No. 3 of 
the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 89th Cong. , 1st Sess. (1965); Hearings 
on S. 1006 Before the Subcomm. on Patents, Trademarks, and Copyrights 
of the Sen. Judiciary Comm., 89th Cong., 1st & 2d Sess. (1965-1966). 
-
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over, the Copyright Office prepared a supplementary report 
to accompany the 1965 draft revision bill. 22 Although addi-
tional hearings were held in subsequent sessions, 23 and revi-
sion bills were submitted to Congress in each term for the 
next ten years, 24 discussion over the termination provisions, 
and the Exception, was essentially completed at this time. 
Congress enacted the termination provisions and the Excep-
tion in the 1976 Act in virtually the same form as they ap-
peared in the 1965 draft revision bill. 25 
III 
Section 304 of the 1976 Act significantly affected the rights 
of Mills and the Snyders in three ways. First, § 304(b) pro-
vided an automatic extension of the life of the copyright; in-
stead of expiring in 1980 at the end of the second renewal pe-
riod, the copyright on the Song will endure until 1999. 26 
Second, § 304(c) gave the widow and surviving son of Ted 
Snyder a right to terminate the grant to Mills of rights in the 
renewal copyright.~ That termination could be effected at 
22 Supplementary Report of the Register of Copyrights on the General 
Revision of the U. S. Copyright Law: 1965 Revision Bill, 89th Cong., 1st 
Sess., Copyright Law Revision, Part 6 (H. Judiciary Comm. Print 1965). 
23 H. R. Rep. No. 1476, supra, at 48-50. 
24 lbid. 
25 Compare H. R. 4347, 89th Cong. , 2d Sess. §§203, 304(c) (1965) with 17 
U. S. C. §§ 203, 304(c). 
26 That section provides: 
"The duration of any copyright, the renewal term of which is subsisting 
at any time between December 31, 1976, and December 31, 1977, inclusive, 
or for which renewal registration is made between December 31, 1976, and 
December 31, 1977, inclusive, is extended to endure for a term of seventy-
five years from the date copyright was originally secured." 17 U. S. C. 
§ 304(b). 
27 Relevant portions of that section read as follows: 
"In the case of any copyright subsisting in either its first or renewal term 
on January 1, 1978, other than a copyright in a work made for hire, the 
exclusive or nonexclusive grant of a transfer or license of the renewal copy-
right or any right under it, executed before January 1, 1978, by any of the 
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any time during the five-year period after January 1, 1978, 
by serving a written notice on Mills and recording a copy in 
the Copyright Office before it became effective. 
Third, § 304(c)(6) provided that the termination would 
cause all rights "covered by the terminated grant" to revert 
to Snyder's widow and son. That reversion was, however, 
subject to an exception that permitted a previously prepared 
derivative work to continue to be utilized after the termina-
tion "under the terms of the grant." 28 
IV 
On January 3, 1978, the Snyders delivered a written notice 
of termination to Mills. The notice complied with § 304(c); it 
identified the Song and stated that the termination applied to 
the "[g]rant or transfer of copyright and the rights of copy-
right proprietor, including publication and recording rights." 
Additionally, the notice stated that it would become effective 
on January 3, 1980. 29 On August 11, 1980, the Snyders ad-
otherwise than by will, is subject to termination under the following 
conditions: 
"(2) Where an author is dead, his or her termination interest is owned, 
and may be exercised, by his widow or her widower and his or her children 
or grandchildren ... 
"(3) Termination of the grant may be effected at any time during a pe-
riod of five years beginning at the end of fifty-six years from the date copy-
right was originally secured, or beginning on January 1, 1978, whichever is 
later. 
"(4) The termination shall be effected by serving an advance notice in 
writing upon the grantee or the grantee's successor in title. 
"(5) Termination of the grant may be effected notwithstanding any 
agreement to the contrary, an agreement to make a will or to make any 
future grant." Id., at § 304(c). 
28 Id., at § 304(c)(6)(A). 
29 App. 54. The record identifies Belwin-Mills Publishing Corporation 
as the grantee whose rights were to be terminated; the parties make no 
distinction between this entity and "Mills." Id. 
-
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vised Fox that Mills' interest in the copyright had been ter-
minated and demanded that the royalties on the derivative 
works be remitted to them. Fox placed the disputed funds 
in escrow and initiated an interpleader action in the United 
States District Court for the Southern District of New York. 
Mills and the Snyders appeared therein, agreed on the rele-
vant facts, and filed cross-motions for summary judgment. 
The District Court entered judgment for Mills. 543 F. 
Supp. 844 (SDNY 1982). 
In an exhaustive opinion, the District Court first held that 
the record companies' derivative works had been "prepared 
under the authority of the grant" frotn Snyder to Mills. The 
court then noted that the statute did not make "any distinc-
tion between grantees who themselves make or own deriva-
tive works and those who license others to do so." Id., at 
854. Accordingly, the court concluded that the terms of the 
various contracts that had been in effect prior to the termina-
tion governed the record companies' obligation to pay royal-
ties and that under those arrangements Mills and the Sny-
ders were each entitled to a 50 percent share in the net 
royalties. Id., at 867-869. 
Relying on three "propositions," the Court of Appeals for 
the Second Circuit reversed. 720 F. 2d 733 (1983). First, it 
reasoned that Mills was relying on two separate grants-the 
1940 grant from Snyder to Mills and the later grants by Mills 
to the record companies-but that the Exception preserved 
only the second set of grants. Because the Snyders' termi-
nation caused the ownership of the underlying copyright to 
revert to them, the court viewed that reversion as carrying 
with it Mills' right to collect the royalties payable under the 
grants to the record companies. Id., at 738-740. Second, 
the court determined that § 304 was enacted for the benefit of 
authors and that the Exception was designed to protect "uti-
lizers" of derivative works; because Mills as a publisher was 
neither an author nor a "utilizer," it was not a member of 
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739-740. Third, the Court of Appeals read the legislative 
history as indicating that Congress had not contemplated a 
situation in which the authority to prepare derivative works 
was derived from two successive grants rather than a single 
grant directly from an author to a "utilizer." Id., at 740-741. 
The court felt that if Congress had confronted this situation, 
it would not have wanted "publishers and other noncreative 
middlemen to share in original derivative works royalites 
after termination." Id., at 743. 
Having granted Mills' petition for a writ of certiorari in 
order to resolve this important question of copyright law, 
-- U. S. --, we now reverse. We are not persuaded 
that Congress intended to draw a distinction between au-
thorizations to prepare derivative works that are based on a 
single direct grant and those that are based on successive 
grants. Rather, we believe the consequences of a termina-
tion that § 304 authorizes simply do not apply to derivative 
works that the Exception defined in § 304(c)(6)(A) protects. 
The boundaries of that Exception are defined by reference to 
the scope of the privilege that had been authorized under the 
terminated grant and by reference to the time the derivative 
works were prepared. The derivative works involved in this 
case are unquestionably within those boundaries. 
V 
In construing a federal statute it is appropriate to assume 
that the ordinary meaning of the language that Congress em-
ployed "accurately expresses the legislative purpose." 30 We 
therefore start with an examination of the statutory text. 
The critical subparagraph-§ 304(c)(6)(A)-carves out an 
exception from the reversion of rights that takes place when 
an author exercises his right to termination. A single sen-
'JO Park 'n Fly v. Dollar Park and Fly; Inc. , -- U. S. --, --
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tence that uses the word "grant" three times defines the 
scope of the Exception. It states: 
"A derivative work prepared under authority of the 
grant before its termination may continue to be utilized 
under the terms of the grant after its termination, but 
this privilege does not extend to the preparation after 
the termination of other derivative works based upon the 
copyrighted work covered by the terminated grant." 17 
U. S. C. § 304(c)(6)(A) (emphasis supplied). 
The third reference is to "the terminated grant" which, in 
this case, must refer to Snyder's grant to Mills in 1940. It is 
logical to assume that the same word has the same meaning 
when it is twice used earlier in the same sentence. 31 The ref-
erence to a derivative work at the beginning of the Exception 
is to one that was prepared "under the authority of the 
grant." Again, because Mills, or Fox as its agent, author- , 
ized the preparation of each of the 400-odd sound recordings 
while Mills was the owner of the copyright, each of those de-
rivative works was unquestionably prepared "under the au-
thority of the grant." The 1940 grant from Snyder to Mills 
expressly gave Mills the authority to license others to make 
derivative works. 32 Thus, whether the phrase "under the 
authority of the grant" is read to encompass both the original 
grant to Mills and the subsequent licenses that Mills issued, 
31 Erlenbaugh v. United States , 409 U. S. 239, 243 (1972) ("a legislative 
body generally uses a particular word with a consistent meaning in a given 
context"). 
32 See n. 10, SU'f)Ta. Of course, if a license that Mills issued to a record 
company had authorized the preparation of several derivative works, only 
one of which had been prepared at the time of Snyder's termination, the 
remaining, unexercised portion of the licensee's authority would constitute 
a part of the "terminated grant." In this case, however, each license that 
Mills issued apparently authorized the preparation of only one derivative 
work. Thus, at the very least, the "terminated grant" encompassed Mills' 
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or only the original grant, it is inescapable that the word 
"grant" must refer to the 1940 grant from Snyder to Mills. 33 
The second use of the word "grant" is in the critical phrase 
that allows the record companies to continue to utilize pre-
viously prepared derivative works "under the terms of the 
grant after its termination." To give the word a consistent 
meaning, we must again read it to encompass the original 
grant from Snyder to Mills, even though it is evident that the 
relevant terms of the grant for a particular licensee must also 
include the specific terms of its license. 
Although a consistent reading of the word "grant" in the 
text of § 304(c)(6)(A) encompasses the 1940 grant from Sny-
der to Mills, the Court of Appeals concluded that the Excep-
tion preserved nothing more than the grants from Mills to the 
record companies. As we have briefly noted earlier, the 
Court of Appeals rested its conclusion on three separate 
propositions, each of which merits discussion. 
The Two Separate Grants 
The Court of Appeals based its conclusion that Mills could 
not prevail largely on its view that the grant from Snyder to 
Mills was entirely separate from subsequent "grants" by 
Mills to the record companies. It reasoned: 
"Since the only grants which have terms that define the 
circumstances under which derivative works are to be 
prepared and utilized are the Mills-record company 
grants, it is the terms of those grants that the Exception 
preserves, not the grant from the Snyders giving Mills 
50% of the mechanical royalties." 720 F. 2d, at 739. 
It is undisputed that the 1940 grant did not itself specify 
the terms that would apply to the use of any particular deriv-
ative work. The licenses that Mills, or its agent Fox, exe-
33 The word "grant" is also used repeatedly in the remainder of § 304. 
That section is too long to quote in full, but a reading of the entire section 
discloses that the term is consistently used in a way that must encompass 
the original grant by an author or his heirs. 
-
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cuted contain those terms. But if the underlying grant from 
Snyder to Mills in 1940 had not authorized those separate li-
censes, they would have been nullities. Moreover, if the li-
censes are examined separately from that earlier grant, they 
merely require that royalty payments be made to Mills or to 
Fox as the collection agent for Mills. 34 In terms, they do not 
provide for any payments at all to the Snyders. The source 
of the Snyders' entitlement to a 50 percent share in the 
royalty income is the 1940 grant. Thus, a fair construction 
of the phrase "under the terms of the grant" as applied to any 
particular licensee would necessarily encompass both the 
1940 grant and the individual license executed pursuant 
thereto. 35 
If the scope of the entire set of documents that created and 
defined each licensee's right to prepare and distribute deriva-
tive works is used to define the relevant "terms of the grant" 
for purposes of the Exception, those terms include Mills' 
right to obtain 100 percent of the' net royalty income in the 
first instance and Mills' obligation thereafter to remit 50 per-
cent of those revenues to the Snyders. If, as the Court of 
Appeals held, the Exception limits the relevant "terms of the 
grant" to those appearing in the individual licenses, two 
rather glaring incongruities would result. First, the word 
"grant" would have inconsistent meanings in the same sen-
tence, and in fact, within the entirety of both§ 304(c) and the 
remainder of § 304. Second, and of greater importance, 
there would be neither a contractual nor a statutory basis for 
paying any part of the derivative works royalties to the 
Snyders. 
The licenses issued to the record companies are the source 
of their contractual obligation to pay royalties; viewed apart 
from the 1940 grant, those licenses confer no rights on the 
Snyders. Moreover, although the termination has caused 
34 App. 22-27. 
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the ownership of the copyright to revert to the Snyders, 
nothing in the statute gives them any right to acquire any 
contractual rights that the Exception preserves. The Sny-
ders' status as owner of the copyright gives them no right to 
collect royalties by virtue of the Exception from users of pre-
viously authorized derivative works. Stating the same point 
from the perspective of the licensees, it is clear that they 
have no direct contractual obligation to the new owner of the 
copyright. The licensees are merely contractually obligated 
to make payments of royalties under terms upon which they 
have agreed. The statutory transfer of ownership of the 
copyright cannot fairly be regarded as a statutory assign-
ment of contractual rights. 36 
The "Utilizer" of a Derivative Work 
The second of the Court of Appeals' propositions stated 
that Mills is not the "utilizer" of a derivative work because 
36 The District Court concluded that, absent the Mills' licenses to the 
record companies, the record companies would be infringers. 543 F. 
Supp., at 850-851. The Court of Appeals accepted this conclusion. 720 
F . 2d, at 738, n. 8. Moreover, under the copyright law, both before and 
after the 1976 Act, the record companies had a statutory right to obtain 
self-executing compulsory licenses from Mills. See 17 U. S. C. § 115; 17 
U. S. C. §§ l(e), l0l(e) (1976 ed.) (1909 Act). In the District Court, the 
Snyders contended that the Exception was wholly inapplicable because the 
record companies had statutory compulsory licenses and therefore their 
sound recordings had not been prepared "under the authority of the grant" 
within the meaning of the 1976 Act. The District Court rejected this con-
tention, 543 F . Supp., at 851-852, finding that either Mills or its agent, 
Fox, executed the licenses; therefore, the licenses were not self-executing. 
This contention was not renewed in either the Court of Appeals or in this 
Court. Additionally, although the Snyders contended otherwise in the 
District Court, id., at 850-851, they no longer challenge the proposition 
that Mills issued the pretermination licenses "under the authority of the 
grant" within the meaning of the Act. It is the royalty income generated 
by these 400-odd derivative works prepared before the termination that is 
at issue in this case. Mills acknowledges that it may not authorize the 
preparation of any additional works and that its only claim to an interest in 
royalties is that preserved by the Exception. 
-
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"[a]ll that Mills did was to utilize the underlying copyright 
when it owned it by licensing others to create and utilize de-
rivative works. " 720 F. 2d, at 739. Building on its errone-
ous first proposition, the court determined: 
"The language of the Exception supports such a conclu-
sion. The Exception provides that the derivative work 
must be prepared under the authority of the grant, ex-
cluding, therefore, unauthorized derivative works. It is 
only grants from Mills to the record companies which au-
thorize the preparation and creation of the derivative 
works here involved. The Exception, then, protects 
creators who utilize derivative works prepared under 
the authority of the grant authorizing the creation of 
such derivative works." Ibid. 
Although not expressly adopting the Court of Appeals' first 
proposition regarding "two grants," respondents expand on 
the court's second propostion, urging that the Exception pro-
tects only the utilization of derivative works after the under-
lying copyright has reverted to the author. Br. for Re-
spondents 3-8. 
The protection provided to those who utilized previously 
prepared derivative works is not, however, unlimited. The 
word "utilized" as written in the Exception cannot be sepa-
rated from its context and read in isolation. It is expressly 
confined by "the terms of the grant. " The contractual ob-
ligation to pay royalties survives the termination and identi-
fies the parties to whom the payment must be made. If the 
Exception is narrowly read to exclude Mills from its cover-
age, thus protecting only the class of "utilizers" as the Sny-
ders wish, the crucial link between the record companies and 
the Snyders will be missing, and the record companies will 
have no contractual obligation to pay royalties to the Sny-
ders. If the statute is read to preserve the total contractual 
relationship, which entitled Mills to make duly authorized de-
rivative works, the record companies continue to have a con-
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The Court of Appeals' third, and last, proposition stated 
that "Congress did not specifically address the situation 
where the grantee from the author has himself subleased or 
subgranted or licensed use of the copyright." 720 F. 2d, at 
740. It considered the statutory text ambiguous because the 
statute "speaks in terms of one grant, while . . . we are deal-
ing with two distinct grants." Id., at 740, n. 12. Because 
the Court of Appeals' review of the legislative history did not 
disclose any specific consideration of the problem that this 
case presents, it further concluded that Congress had simply 
overlooked the possibility that a licensee's authority to pre-
pare derivative works might depend on two separate grants. 
The Court of Appeals, therefore, predicated its construction 
of the Exception largely on its evaluation of the legislative 
purpose: to "protect owners of derivative works like film pro-
ducers who own derivative copyrights in books or plays." 
Id., at 741. 
Unlike the Court of Appeals , we are persuaded that Con-
gress was well aware of the prevalence of multi-party licens-
ing arrangements in the music-publishing industry, as well as 
in other industries that the copyright law vitally affected, 
when it enacted the 1976 Act. There are many references in 
the legislative history to multi-party arrangements in the 
music industry, and to the importance of the role of music 
publishers in the marketing of copyrighted songs. These 
references dissipate the force of the argument that Congress 
did not expressly consider the precise multi-party dispute be-
fore the Court today. 37 Indeed, there is reason to believe 
37 See, e. g. , Report of the Register of Copyrights on the General Revi-
sion of the U. S. Copyright Law, supra, at 33 ("In practice the authors of 
musical works generally assign their recording and other rights to publish-
ers, under an agreement for the division of royalties. In most instances 
the record companies secure licenses from the publishers, thereby avoiding 
some of the mechanics of notice and accounting required by the statute for 
exercise of the compulsory license."); H. Henn, The Compulsory License 
-
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that the 50 percent arrangement between Snyder and Mills 
that was made in 1940 was a typical example of the form of 
copyright grant that had been prevalent in this industry for 
Provisions of the U. S. Copyright Law, 86th Cong., 1st Sess., Copyright 
Law Revision, Studies Prepared for the Subcomm. on Patents, Trade-
marks, and Copyrights of the Senate Judiciary Comm., Study No. 5, at 47 
(H. Judicairy Comm. Print 1960) ("the general practice is for the composer 
to assign his common-law copyright to a music publisher") (footnote omit-
ted); A. Kaminstein, Divisibility of Copyrights, 86th Cong., 2d Sess., 
Copyright Law Revision, Studies Prepared for the Subcomm. on Patents, 
Trademarks, and Copyrights of the Senate Judiciary Comm., Study No. 
11, at 23 (H. Judiciary Comm. Print 1960) ("[i]n the music industry, the 
prevailing custom is that statutory copyright in sheet music is secured in 
the name of the publisher"); Copyright Law Revision: Hearings on H. R. 
4347, H. R. 5680, H. R. 6831, H. R. 6835, supra, at 680 ("Copyrights al-
most invariably are owned by publishers, whose contracts with songwrit-
ers customarily provide for an equal division of royalties received from the 
exploitation of mechanical reproduction rights. Attempts occasionally are 
made to create the image of a large record company dealing with an inno-
cent composer, but this is pure myth; the composer turns his manuscript 
over to a publisher and the latter is the copyright proprietor from which 
the record company must get its rights.") (footnote omitted) (statement of 
Record Industry Association of America, Inc.); id. , at 1743-1744 (state-
ment of Robert R. Nathan, Music Publishers Protective Association, Inc.); 
cf. Copyright Law Revision: Hearings on H. R. 2223 Before the Subcomm. 
on Courts, Civil Liberties, and the Administration of Justice of the House 
Comm. on the Judiciary, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 1369 (1975) ("There are sev-
eral distinct groups of people who are involved in bringing about recorded 
music. There is the composer of the music, there is the publisher, there is 
the artist who records the music, and there is the record company that pro-
duces and distributes the record.") (testimony of Vincent T. Wasilewski, 
President, National Association of Broadcasters); id. , at 1651- 1653 (letter 
of Leonard Feist, National Music Publishers' Association, Inc.); id., at 
1653 ("I feel that the argument is not with the publisher because when I 
went into New York last year to compose the music for 'A Chorus Line.' I 
did it with a new writer by the name of Ed Kleban. He is not a proven 
writer yet. He has been subsidized for the last few years, been given 
money by a publishing company to actually be able to live and to be allowed 
to write. I think that for every instance where a publisher, say, a person 
who does not help, I think that there are a vast amount of people who can 
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many years. 38 Rather than assuming that Congress was un-
aware of a common practice in one of the industries that the 
general revision of the copyright law, and the termination 
provisions, most significantly affected we think it more prob-
able that Congress saw no reason to draw a distinction be-
tween a direct grant by an author to a party that produces 
derivative works itself and a situation in which a middleman 
is given authority to make subsequent grants to such produc-
ers. For whether the problem is analyzed from the author's 
point of view or that of the producer of derivative works, the 
statutory purposes are equally well-served in either case. 
The principal purpose of the amendments in § 304 was to 
provide added benefits to authors. The extension of the du-
ration of existing copyrights to 75 years, the provision of a 
longer term (the author's life plus 50 years) for new copy-
rights, and the concept of a termination right itself, were all 
obviously intended to make the rewards for the creativity of 
authors more substantial. More particularly, the termina-
tion right was expressly intended to relieve authors of the 
consequences of ill-advised and unremunerative grants that 
material, just by having faith in an individual, and obviously, Ed Kleban 
now has proved that he is good, and the publisher has proved that it was 
worth the investment. I just want to make sure that you understand that 
the plight of the composer is not up against the publisher because we have 
had great success with dealings with publishers. It is elsewhere where we 
seem to get into trouble.") (testimony of Marvin Hamlisch, composer). 
38 See, e.g., W. Blaisdell, Size of the Copyright Industries, 86th Cong., 
1st Sess. , Copyright Law Revision, Studies Prepared for the Subcomm. on 
Patents, Trademarks, and Copyrights of the Senate Judiciary Comm., 
Study No. 2, at 49 (H. Judiciary Comm. Print 1960) ("Music composers and 
lyricists usually assign all rights in their works, including the right to claim 
copyright, to a music publisher, subject to the provisions of the contract of 
assignment. In general the contract provides that the composer-lyricists 
are to receive not less than 50 percent of the gross returns from the sales of 
the work in whatever form. "); Copyright Law Revision: Hearings on H. R. 
4347, H. R. 5680, H. R. 6831, H. R. 6835, supra, at 781, 844 ("equal split 
of copyright license fees between publishers and songwriters is based upon 
industry practice) (statement of John Desmond Glover). 
-
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had been made before the author had a fair opportunity to ap-
preciate the true value of his work product. 39 That general 
purpose is plainly defined in the legislative history and, in-
deed, is fairly inferable from the text of § 304 itself. 
The exception in § 304(c)(6)(A) was designed, however, to 
exclude a specific category of grants-even if they were man-
ifestly unfair to the author-from that broad objective. The 
purpose of the Exception was to "preserve the right of the 
owner of a derivative work to exploit it, notwithstanding the 
reversion." 40 Therefore, even if a person acquired the right 
to exploit an already prepared derivative work by means of 
an unfavorable bargain with an author, that right was to be 
excluded from the bundle of rights that would revert to the 
author when he exercised his termination right. The critical 
point in determining whether the right to continue utilizing a 
derivative work survives the termination of a transfer of a 
copyright is whether it was "prepared" before the termina-
tion. Pretermination derivative works-those prepared 
under the authority of the terminated grant-may continue 
to be utilized under the terms of the terminated grant. De-
rivative works prepared after the termination of the grant 
are not extended this exemption from the termination provi-
39 In explaining of the comparable termination provision in § 203, the 
House Report states: 
"A provision of this sort is needed because of the unequal bargaining posi-
tion of authors, resulting in part from the impossibility of determining a 
work's value until it has been exploited. Section 203 reflects a practical 
compromise that will further the objectives of the copyright law while rec-
ognizing the problems and legitimate needs of all interests involved." 
H. R. Rep. No. 1476, supra, at 124. 
40 Further Discussions and Comments on Preliminary Draft for Revised 
U. S. Copyright Law, 88th Cong., supra, at 39 (statement of Barbara 
Ringer). The House report that accompanyied the 1976 Act, certainly 
persuasive leglislative history, affirmatively supports this view. Regard-
ing § 203(b), § 304(c)'s counterpart, it stated: "This clause provides that, 
notwithstanding a termination, a derivative work prepared earlier may 
'continue to be utilized' under the conditions of the terminated grant." 
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sions. It is a matter of indifference-as far as the reason for 
giving protection to derivative works is concerned-whether 
the authority to prepare the work had been received in a di-
rect license from an author, or in a series of licenses and 
sublicenses. The scope of the duly authorized grant and the 
time the derivative work was prepared are what the statute 
makes relevant because these are the factors that determine 
which of the statute's two countervailing purposes should 
control. 41 
The obligation of an owner of a derivative work to pay roy-
alties based on his use of the underlying copyright is not sub-
ject to renegotiation because the Exception protects it. The 
"terms of the grant" as existing at the time of termination 
govern the author's right to receive royalties; those terms 
are therefore excluded from the bundle of rights that the au-
thor may seek to resell unimpeded by any ill-advised prior 
commitment. The statutory distinction between the rights 
that revert to the author and those that do not revert is 
based on the character of the right-not on the form or the 
number of written instruments that gave the owner of the de-
rivative work the authority· to prepare it. Nothing in the 
legislative history or the language of the statute indicates 
that Congress intended the Exception to distinguish between 
two-party transactions and those involving multiple parties. 
The example most frequently discussed in the legislative 
history concerning the Exception involved th!;! sale of a copy-
righted story to a motion picture producer. 42 The Court of 
• 1 The legislative history also indicates that Congress intended the termi-
nation provisions to produce an accommodation and a balancing among var-
ious interests. See H. R. Rep. No. 1476, supra, at 124, 140; Senate Judi-
ciary Comm. , Copyright Law Revision, S. Rep. No. 473, 94th Cong. , 1st 
Sess. 108 (1975) (accompanying S. 22, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. ). 
42 Regarding § 203(b), the House report stated: 
"[N]otwithstanding a termination, a derivative work prepared earlier may 
'continue to be utilized' under the conditions of the terminated grant; the 
clause adds, however, that this privilege is not broad enough to permit the 
preparation of other derivative works. In other words , a film made from a 
- ~ 
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Appeals explained the need for the Exception as the interest 
in protecting the large investment that is required to produce 
a motion picture, and recognized that record companies simi-
larly must also make a significant investment in compensat-
ing vocalists, musicians, arrangers, and recording engineers. 
Therefore, the court concluded that record companies are 
clearly within the class that the Exception protects. The 
court felt, however, that music publishers-as middlemen-
were not similarly situated, but rather merely had an owner-
ship interest in the copyright that reverted to the author 
upon termination. 720 F. 2d, at 742-743. As a matter of 
fact-or of judicial notice-we are in no position to evaluate 
the function that each music publisher actually performs in 
the marketing of each copyrighted song. But based on our 
reading of the statute and its legislative history, 43 in inter-
play could continue to be licensed for performance after the motion picture 
contract had been terminated but any remake rights covered by the con-
tract would be cut off. For this purpose, a motion picture would be con-
sidered as a 'derivative work' with respect to every 'preexisting work' in-
corporated in it, whether the preexisting work was created independently 
or was prepared expressly for the motion picture." H. R. Rep. No. 1476, 
supra, 127. 
See also Preliminary Draft for Revised U. S. Copyright Law and Discus-
sions and Comments on the Draft, supra, 278 (statement of Barbara 
Ringer, Register of Copyrights). 
43 The legislative history indicates the usual practice: 
"Book authors contract with book publishers for the publication of their 
works, the publisher taking title to all rights in the work subject to the 
provisions of the contract. The author usually receives a royalty com-
puted as a percentage of the price at which each book is sold or as a per-
centage of the total volume of sales." W. Blaisdell, Size of Copyright In-
dustries, supra, at 88. 
Later, the same study indicates: 
"In motion picture production creative material form both storywriters and 
composers is used. Motion picture producers employ creative talent on an 
employee-for-hire basis and on a freelance basis. However, the business 
contracts for the writing and adaptation of story material between the As-
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preting the Exception we find no reason to differentiate be-
tween a book publisher's license to a motion-picture producer 
and a music publisher's license to a record company. N ei-
ther publisher is the author of the underlying work. If, as 
the legislative history plainly discloses, the Exception limits 
the reversion right of an author who granted his copyright on 
an original story to a book publisher who in turn granted a 
license to a motion-picture producer, we can see no reason 
why the Exception should not also limit the right of a com-
poser, like Snyder, who made such a grant to a music pub-
lisher, like Mills, that preceded a series of licenses to record 
companies. 
VI 
Finally, respondents argue that the legislative history \ 
demonstrates that the Exception was designed to accomplish 
a well-identified purpose-to enable derivative works to con-
tinue to be accessible to the public after the exercise of an 
author's termination rights. 44 Specifically, that history dis-
pr-ovide almost exclusively for employees for hire and it is only in unusual 
cases that freelance contracts are used. Of course, motion picture produc-
ers purchase rights to story material from book publishers who hold copy-
rights to novels, stories, etc. In most of these cases, a large portion of the 
purchase price goes to the original author; generally a book publisher re-
tains only the equivalent of an agent's 10 percent fee." Id., at 55 (empha-
sis added). 
44 They point out that even without the creation of the termination right 
in the 1976 Act, there had been concern about the status of certain deriva-
tive works. Moreover, they assert that under the 1909 Act, if an author 
alienated his renewal-term copyright, but died before his renewal-term 
vested, the author's transfer of his renewal rights was a nullity because the 
right in the renewal term was exercisable only by the author's statutory 
successors. Thus, according to respondents, the original-term transferee 
who had made a derivative work could be enjoined from continuing to use 
the derivative work because it might infringe the underlying copyright in 
the renewal term. Some observers apparently believed that the Court of 
Appeals for the Second Circuit acknowledged support for this view in G. 
Ricardi & Co. v. Paramount Pictures, Inc., 189 F. 2d 469,471 (CA2), cert. 
denied, 342 U. S. 849 (1951), when it wrote that "[a] copyright renewal ere-
-
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closes a concern about the status of a number of motion-pic-
ture films that had been prepared pursuant to grants by book 
publishers. Without the Exception, the reversion that an 
author's termination effected would have given the author 
the power to prevent further utilization of the motion picture 
films, or possibly to demand royalties that the film producers 
were unwilling to pay. Because the specific problem that 
the Exception addressed involved a potential confrontation 
between derivative-works utilizers and authors who had re-
captured their copyrights, respondents argue that Congress 
must have intended its response to the problem to affect only 
those two interests. 
The argument is unpersuasive. It explains why the Ex-
ception protects the utilizer of a derivative work from being 
required to pay an increased royalty to the author. It pro-
vides no support, however, for the proposition that Congress 
expected the author to be able to collect an increased royalty 
for the use of a derivative work. On the contrary, this his-
tory is entirely consistent with the view that the terms of the 
grant that were applicable to the use of derivative works at 
the time of termination should remain in effect. The public 
interest in preserving the status quo with respect to deriva-
tive works is equally well served by either petitioner's or re-
spondents' reading of the Exception. Respondents' argu-
ment thus sheds no light on the meaning of the phrase "the 
terms of the grant." Surely it does not justify the replace-
ment of contractual terms that unambiguously require pay-
ment of royalties to a publisher with a new provision direct-
ing payment to an author instead. 
ates a new estate, and the few cases which have dealt with the subject as-
sert that the new estate is clear of all rights, interests or licenses granted 
under the original copyright. " Therefore, respondents reason that there 
was confusion after R icardi regarding whether the law allowed a deriva-
tive-work owner to utilize the work after the expiration of the underlying 
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Under the terms of the grant in effect at the time of termi-
nation, Mills is entitled to a share of the royalty income in 
dispute. 
The judgment of the Court of Appeals is reversed. 
It is so ordered. 
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